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Abstract
Most of the actions that fall under the trilogy of cyber crime, terrorism, 
and war exploit pre-existing weaknesses in the underlying technology. 
Because these vulnerabilities that exist in the network are not themselves 
illegal, they tend to be overlooked in the debate on cyber security. A UK 
report on the cost of cyber crime illustrates this approach. Its authors 
chose to exclude from their analysis the "costs in anticipation of cyber 
crime, such as insurance costs and the costs of purchasing anti-virus soft-
ware," on the basis that "these are likely to be factored into normal day-
to-day expenditures for the Government, businesses, and individuals."1 
This article contends if these costs had been quantified and integrated 
into the cost of cyber crime, then the analysis would have revealed that 
what matters is not so much cyber crime, but the fertile terrain of vulner-
abilities that unleash a range of possibilities to whomever wishes to 
exploit them. By downplaying the vulnerabilities, the threats represented 
by cyber war, cyber terrorism, and cyber crime are conversely inflated. 
Therefore, reassessing risk as a strategy for security in cyberspace must 
include acknowledgment of understated vulnerabilities, as well as a better 
distributed knowledge about the nature and character of the overhyped 
threats of cyber crime, cyber terrorism, and cyber war.
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Introduction
Ulrich Beck's Risk Society, published in 1986, proposed a new reading of 
the changes experienced by modern society since the early 1970s, 
grounded on his analysis of the environmental and health hazards caused 
by pollution and nuclear technology.2 Twenty-odd years later, the risks 
and patterns of reactions he described in a world without the Internet are 
surprisingly apt for analyzing security issues in cyberspace. For Beck, the 
risks that industrialization and modernization created tend to be global, 
systemic with a "boomerang effect,"3 and denied, overlooked, or over-
hyped.4 The very nature of information technology, with the creation of 
the World Wide Web (WWW), its ubiquity, and the interconnectedness 
that it creates between systems heightens the possibility of "cascading 
effects."5 Moreover, the narrative about cyber risks is dominated by com-
peting expert claims, alongside a media prone to inflate cyber risks.6 
Indeed, a quick glance at the recent official reports, in the UK and inter-
nationally, reveals different perspectives on risks in cyberspace. For a few, 
if the use of cyber weapons "will shortly become ubiquitous,"7 "it is 
unlikely that there will ever be a true cyber war" since, notably, "there is 
no strategic reason why any aggressor would limit themselves to only one 
class of weaponry."8 For others, on the contrary, cyber war is a serious 
possibility,9 if not already an entrenched reality.10 In addition, cyber 
crime costs billions;11 and its occurrence, as well as that of cyber terror-
ism, are doomed to increase.12
The media reports on the latest attacks, such as the one on the European 
Commission in late March 2011,13 seem to give credit to these gloomy 
views. The complexity of some cyber incidents does not dispel the sensa-
tion of an undefined but serious danger. In 2007, when Estonia faced a 
series of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks against its govern-
mental and critical private-sector IT structure, as well as the defacement 
of the prime minister's party's website, it first accused Russia of ordering 
the attacks. The attacks seemed to originate from Russian servers and 
computers, and there was a dispute about a Russian war memorial. How-
ever, the compromised computers thought to be Russian in the early days 
of the attacks could have been zombies controlled by any citizens, includ-
ing Estonians. In addition, Russia denied the attacks and did not issue 
threats or take further action. At the end, Estonia came to the conclusion 
that it could not identify the attackers well enough to affirm whether it 
had been the victim of a skirmish ordered and supported by a nation, a 
terrorist organization, an organized crime group, or just a crime commit-
ted by individuals. Of course, not all cyber incidents are so complex. Nev-
ertheless, the exact nature of cyber attacks and sometimes their scale tend 
to be difficult to assess; and their authors often cannot be identified.14 
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Cyber incidents are not always visible until it is too late, which is the very 
characteristic of modern risk.15
The proper approach is to gain a better understanding of the cyber threat, 
which is precisely what Beck advocated in his 1986 Risk Society.16 The 
2007 Estonian incident cited above triggered a reassessment of cyber 
risks, with nation-states and international organizations (NATO,17 
OECD) reflecting on what happened and what could happen. Knowledge 
is at the heart of a strategy for security in cyberspace. Otherwise, "[i]nade-
quate knowledge … leads to over- or underestimating the real need for 
cyber security," hence "generating insecurity and fear."18 But this knowl-
edge must not limit itself to the illegal behaviors that can constitute cyber 
crime, terrorism, or war. It must also encompass the very roots of these 
threats. Indeed, most of the actions that fall under the trilogy of cyber 
crime, terrorism, and war exploit pre-existing weaknesses in the technol-
ogy. Maybe because these vulnerabilities in the network, in the exploita-
tion systems, and in applications are not themselves illegal, they tend to 
be overlooked in the debate on cyber security. The UK report on the cost 
of cyber crime illustrates this approach. Its authors chose to exclude from 
their analysis the "costs in anticipation of cyber crime, such as insurance 
costs and the costs of purchasing anti-virus software," on the basis that 
"these are likely to be factored into normal day-to-day expenditures for 
the Government, businesses, and individuals."19 But maybe if these costs 
had been quantified and integrated into the cost of cyber crime, the analy-
sis would have revealed that what matters is not so much cyber crime as 
the fertile terrain of vulnerabilities that unleash a range of possibilities to 
whomever wishes to exploit them. By downplaying the former, the threats 
represented by cyber war, cyber terrorism, and cyber crime are conversely 
inflated. Therefore, reassessing risk as a viable strategy for security in 
cyberspace means the acknowledgment of understated vulnerabilities as 
much as it means a better knowledge of the overhyped threats of cyber 
crime, cyber terrorism, and cyber war.
Overhyped Threats: Towards a Strategy of 
Knowledge
The discourse on cyber threats tends to be dominated by excessive public-
ity given to some threats to the detriment of others, and by exaggerated 
claims about the frequency and scale of the attacks. This narrative distorts 
the public perception of the threats and masks the need for better detec-
tion tools and information-sharing strategies. Media coverage, for exam-
ple, concentrates on reporting large-scale attacks as if the bigger the 
attack, the bigger the threat.20 However, cyber incidents can be less dra-
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matic, more frequent, and just as serious. The last attack suffered by the 
EU Commission on 23 March 2011 may have been large in scale and 
worth an article, but as acknowledged by Antony Gravili, the spokesman 
for the inter-institutional relations and administration commissioner, 
"the commission is frequently targeted" and it "isn't unusual" to launch an 
inquiry to understand better what has happened and the impact of the 
incident.21 Yet most times it does not hit the headlines.
To be fair, the diversity of methods used to collect information on cyber 
incidents can produce widely different results. Compounded sometimes 
with a lack of adequate statistics from official sources, this facilitates 
extrapolations about the scale of the problem and the cost of cyber 
crimes.22 In the UK, for example, the Department for Business, 
Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR) conducted its own survey in 
2008 on Information Security Breaches suffered by businesses.23 
Although the information gathered is valuable,24 the survey is based on 
only "1,007 computer-assisted telephone interviews, each lasting on 
average 20 minutes."25 Compared with the 2.10 million enterprises 
registered for European Value Added Tax (VAT) and/or Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) in March 2010,26 the sample appears small, despite specific 
efforts to choose businesses of different sizes and best representative of 
their sectors. Far more problematic in terms of methodology is the 2011 
report on the Cost of cyber crime in the UK. It claims that cyber crime 
costs £27 billion to businesses and citizens. Yet, the report does not use, 
nor for that matter discuss, any official statistics available on cyber crime, 
however flawed they are, as we will see.27 Moreover, its strong focus on 
espionage, in a report that is supposed to embrace all cyber crimes, raises 
important questions about the choice of DETICA, a private corporation 
used to conduct the research. DETICA is a member of the BAE Systems, 
one of the biggest actors of the military-industrial complex and an 
important contractor in the United States and in the UK.28 Its interests 
may not be solely in assessing the cost of all cyber crimes,29 since this 
company recently redeployed itself into the market of cyber security as a 
means to compensate for the loss induced by widespread spending cuts 
promoted by its main States clients.30, 31 Given the context,32 one would 
have wished that the Cabinet Office had been more transparent in its 
reasons, never stated, for choosing DETICA, and maybe in the objectives 
it sought to achieve.33 Espionage at the national level does not represent 
the bulk of cyber crimes, even if the risk it represents and its correlated 
cost can well justify its assessment. Moreover, it may require the 
involvement of the military and intelligence agencies, whereas cyber 
crime is primarily a matter for civilians. The balance between the two is at 
the heart of our democracies. If there is a need to review that balance, it 
should be done without a terminology that makes it difficult to distinguish 
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between cyber crime, cyber terrorism, and cyber war,34 and that 
facilitates, without proper analysis, the involvement of the military in 
matters where it used not to intervene.35
It is true that the technology, notably the distributed nature of the Inter-
net, can make it difficult to clearly attribute some incidents and decide 
whether they are criminal, terrorist actions, or acts of war. Consequently, 
to affirm that "the principal difference" between cyber crime, cyber war-
fare, and cyber terrorism, "is in the attacker's intent"36 is far too simplistic 
when many cyber-attackers cannot be identified.37 It is also quite simplis-
tic to attribute financial motivation only to cyber criminals since terrorists 
can be motivated by monetary gain in order to finance their political 
actions in the physical world or in cyberspace.38, 39 An added difficulty is 
that a pattern of cyber incidents may not reveal itself unless information 
is shared between the different stakeholders. For example, taken in isola-
tion, a bank's website being temporarily unavailable may look innocuous 
and not worth reporting to the competent agencies. Yet, when associated 
with other cyber incidents in which the victims and timeframe are similar, 
it may reveal a concerted effort to target a particular type of business or e-
government resources, a pattern of behavior that could amount to crime 
(fraud, espionage) or terrorism if the motive can be established. Detection 
thus may depend on information being shared. Hence, the importance is 
on promoting best practices and common practices of detection and 
reporting through various means. Critical Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams will have to 
develop and cooperate even more than they do at a national level, and also 
at an international level.40 It is significant that one of the latest European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) reports, published in 
February 2011, is precisely a "Good Practice Guide for Incident Manage-
ment" to promote better and more harmonized analysis of incidents by 
CERTs. When it comes to Critical Infrastructures (CI), information shar-
ing between the public and private sectors is even more important, with 
the added difficulty of devising methods for civilians and the military to 
collaborate in times of peace.41
Technical detection will also have to be combined with adequate legal 
reporting. When it comes to cyber crime, reliable reporting mechanisms 
are not always available. In the UK for example, online reporting is avail-
able only for fraud, via the Action Fraud website, and child pornography, 
extreme pornography, and racial (but not religious or sexual) hatred via 
the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF). All the other online offenses, 
including hacking, have to be reported the traditional way, i.e., by calling 
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the police or going to the police station. Email addresses are rarely avail-
able since the types of offenses to be reported are usually limited to offline 
behavior.42, 43
By contrast, since 2003, the U.S. Internet Complaint Center (IC3), a part-
nership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National 
White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), and the Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA), offers a single online platform for victims to report all cyber 
crimes. Created in 2000 for fraud only, bearing the name then of Internet 
Fraud Complaint Center, it justifies its extension in 2003 to all cyber 
crimes as a means to:
"better reflect the broad character of such matters having an 
Internet, or cyber, nexus referred to the IC3, and to minimize the 
need for one to distinguish 'Internet Fraud' from other potentially 
overlapping cyber crimes."44
The IC3 name reflects "its expanded mission in the fight against cyber 
crime."45 The effect of such a system is the immediate visibility of 
reported cyber crimes, with information being available through one 
source, rather than scattered across three platforms, as in the UK (police 
records, Action Fraud reports, and IWF analysis). The other advantage of 
a centralized and online reporting system is that it encourages reporting 
cyber crimes, thus reducing accordingly the "dark figure" of cyber crime. 
The IC3, for example, experienced a 10% decrease of complaints in 2010, 
but a 22% increase of complaints in 2009 compared to 2008, and in 2008 
a 33.1% increase compared to 2007. Since 2000, the number of com-
plaints went from 16,838 to 303,809 in 2010. Paradoxically, this rise con-
firms the severe underreporting of cyber crime and the need to continue 
educating and encouraging end-users to do so.46
Companies, especially banks, do not want to appear publicly as victims of 
online fraud or extortion threats. Individuals tend not to disclose the loss 
or damage suffered, sometimes just because they do not see the 
importance of reporting. They are not always aware that "[cyber crimes'] 
seriousness [often] lies in their globalized aggregate volume"47 rather 
than in the individual amount lost by the victim. Indeed, a £30 loss for 
one person can mean a £3,000 minimum gain to the offender, given that 
scams are addressed to hundreds of thousands of people online. The "419" 
Nigerian scammers had perfectly understood this harnessing power of the 
Internet. It could even be argued that cyber criminals take advantage of 
the chronic underreporting of cyber crimes. Crime thrives on invisibility, 
but reporting can break that dynamic by exposing the threats and 
compiling their frequency. This is why most anti-virus software 
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companies (Cisco, F-Secure, McAffee, Sophos, Symantec) publish their 
reports. It is also why some nonprofit organizations set up websites to 
report specific behavior. These efforts are laudable; but hidden corporate 
agendas can bring into question the objectivity of reporting, and others 
may drift towards a mindset of "vigilantes."48 It is therefore essential that 
countries develop proper reporting tools that allow for the collection of 
relevant data on cyber crimes. In that respect, the IC3 experience and 
evolution, similar, for example, to that of the French 
Internet.Signalement website, shows the way forward. Hopefully the UK, 
as well as any country that has not yet done so, will contemplate adopting 
a similar approach and create a centralized organization with a correlated 
reporting website. The importance of such a mechanism was highlighted 
indirectly when, in its 2009 report, the IC3 noticed that some complaints 
received were outside its remits because of jurisdictional issues. If the 
victims felt the need to file in these complaints, it may be because of their 
ignorance of the jurisdictional constraints of the IC3, but it may also be 
because they did not find appropriate channels in their own countries to 
report online cyber crimes and preferred to use the IC3 website in the 
hope that their complaints would be transferred to the appropriate 
authorities in their own countries.
Furthermore, reporting tools and derived statistics should cover all vic-
tims, whether corporations or individuals, and for individuals, whatever 
age they are. In the UK, the British Crime Survey (BCS) and the Offend-
ing, Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS), for example, exclude corporations. 
The IC3 reports do not seem to make this distinction. It is thus not sur-
prising that in the UK, the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regula-
tory Reform (BERR) conducted its own survey in 2008 on Information 
Security Breaches suffered by businesses.49 Nevertheless, this survey can-
not be a substitute for proper reporting, given that companies increas-
ingly use the Internet to conduct more of their business and thus are more 
likely to be victimized. Regarding individuals, the problem may arise from 
age selection. The UK OCJS draws "the sample of respondents […] from 
persons aged 10–25 years,"50 leaving aside the other half of the popula-
tion that uses the Internet on a regular basis. This is the same group that 
is often the most vulnerable to security breaches because it is the least lit-
erate about security measures in cyberspace.51 Since the BCS reports only 
online fraud, the OCJS is the only one to cover victimization of all cyber 
crimes. In addition, the OCJS methodology and information is a bit like 
having statistics about theft of mobile phones for the 10–24 year-old pop-
ulation, but not for those aged 25 years and over.
Finally, reporting, and by extension good knowledge of, cyber crimes 
depends on the use of adequate terminology and classification that reflect 
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the diverse range of cyber crimes. In that respect, the IC3's 79 categories 
for classification of cyber incidents robustly covers the different types of 
cyber crimes. The two UK websites for online reporting are also naturally 
structured to classify cyber crimes according to the offenses they cover. 
But this visibility of cyber crimes in the institutions' reports is not always 
matched in the more traditional tools on which statistics are built. For 
example, in the UK the 2010 Counting rules for the Crime Record Survey, 
which comprises the police records compiled nationally, puts all Com-
puter Misuse Act offenses (hacking and manipulation of data) under the 
curious heading of "Preserved Other Fraud and Repealed Fraud Offences 
(Pre-Fraud Act 2006)."52 Similarly, the BCS, which estimates the number 
of unreported crimes by surveying households, reports online fraud under 
the obscure heading of "plastic card fraud," but not any other types of 
cyber crime.53 The fact that in its 2004–05 report thereafter, the BCS 
maintained its questions about mobile phone theft, but stopped its ques-
tions on cyber crimes introduced in its 2002–03 and 2003–04 reports,54 
demonstrates that the centrality of the Internet in our daily lives has not 
yet been integrated in terms of security and crime. At a time when mobile 
phones become mini-computers with Internet access and often no proper 
anti-virus software, it is rather ironic that the BCS reports the theft of 
those phones better than the range of online offenses they can facilitate.
This issue of appropriate terminology and classification has further rami-
fications in terms of the visibility of cyber crimes and the readability of 
statistics. The IC3 tries in its 2009 report to match the categories it uses 
with those of the more traditional tool of reporting crime in the U.S., the 
National Incident-Based Reporting System, which improved the Uniform 
Crime [federal] Reporting in 2003.55 More importantly, the global nature 
of cyber crimes calls for a terminology that would transcend the specifici-
ties of national categories and definitions of cyber crimes. The Convention 
on cyber crime could be used as a canvass, with countries issuing tables of 
equivalence between the Convention's categories and their own. This level 
of integration could even go deeper and in the longer term, one could 
imagine an online reporting mechanism at the international level that 
would use the terminology of the Convention on cyber crime to classify 
the incidents reported. The jurisdictional issues faced by the IC3 show the 
need for such a mechanism. The future will tell if this suggested mecha-
nism is only a dream. Meanwhile, the terminology issue remains valid 
because a global vision of cyber-crime incidents would be facilitated if 
reporting tools were in place to filter cyber incidents according to trans-
versal categories. Overall, better detection tools and mechanisms coupled 
with better communication of information on cyber threats at the interna-
tional level would defuse the hype around the threat and help govern-
ments to shape adequate responses to cyber-crime trends.
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Understated Vulnerabilities: A Strategy of 
Acknowledgment
"Security is only as strong as the weakest link."56 Although cyberspace is a 
"constructed virtual environment within which networked computer 
activity takes place,"57 its vulnerabilities are not solely inherent in the 
technology. Its components, computer hardware and cables, by their tan-
gible nature and their geographical location are also vulnerable to physi-
cal attacks or incidents. They can be damaged, often permanently, by 
bombing or natural events such as solar flares or earthquakes.58 Laptops 
with sensitive information can be stolen or lost. For example, in 2008 UK 
Customs lost four CDs sent by recorded delivery on which all the relevant 
personal data of people claiming child benefits were engraved;59 and in 
2006 the Royal Navy lost a laptop with confidential information.60 Those 
incidents gave ample opportunities for both fraud and access to military 
databases. Similarly, insufficient screening of the physical access of "sen-
sitive" premises can open possibilities for accessing and transferring 
information that should remain confidential or secret and that can be ille-
gally exploited. The recent Wikileaks affair illustrates this point well. The 
cables about the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan have been dis-
closed on the online platform—first of all, because a young soldier was 
able to copy them on CDs and DVDs which he in turn smuggled out of the 
room without being noticed. Wikileaks did not create the security breach; 
it only gave it a resounding platform. Had the basics of physical security 
been complied with by those in charge, and not solely by a young soldier, 
there might have been no Wikileaks scandal.61 In this particular case, the 
hype around the dangers of Wikileaks masks a more sober reality: the fail-
ure to implement routine measures to secure physical premises where 
secret data could be accessed.62 The Wikileaks scandal also reveals how 
undervaluing those vulnerabilities intrinsic to cyberspace creates wide-
ranging risks if the vulnerabilities are exploited. Instead of being over-
looked or downplayed, they should be clearly acknowledged as part of a 
strategy of risk prevention.
Vulnerabilities that stem from technological weaknesses of software, 
computers, and networks are at the root of many, if not most, security 
problems in cyberspace. At the network level, a recent assessment of state 
e-government websites in the United States reveals that "although … the 
sites had most of their Internet ports filtered or behind firewalls, all of 
them had their main IP addresses detected and their port 80/tcp open, 
and 61% of them also had their port 443/tcp open. These findings indicate 
that the sites still had a few spots vulnerable to cyber intrusions and 
hacker attacks because having obtained the IP address of a website, cyber 
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intruders know how to begin to access the server of the site," which 
enables them to gain vital information and ultimately launch a denial of 
service (DOS) attack.63
To limit the vulnerabilities of those websites is particularly important if 
they are part of the Critical Infrastructure (CI) of a country since a 
weakness in one could spread to another or could add to another and 
trigger a systemic risk. Indeed, the technological vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructures need to be assessed per infrastructure (finance, energy, 
water), but also, and more importantly, as a whole, given "the inter-
connectedness of various major government services and large private 
sector systems."64 It is important for the different agencies involved to 
collaborate to identify the weaknesses in "the point of design" and reduce 
the "probability that a triggering event takes place."65 The difficulty here 
arises from conflicting interests in managing the vulnerabilities. The 
privately run sector of CI will not integrate per se the public good in its 
objectives,66 whereas any response to cyber security for CI should put the 
latter at its heart. The difficulty is exacerbated by the nature of the actors 
involved. Traditionally it falls on governments to promote the public 
good, with the involvement of the military in exceptional cases, and the 
private sector is kept at bay. This framework runs counter to the very 
organization of the CI, where the private sector dominates and will not 
naturally contact the military. Finally, these intrinsic vulnerabilities can 
be aggravated by extrinsic vulnerabilities not specific to cyberspace, such 
as difficulties in identifying communication channels and the lack of 
organizational structures that are competent in dealing with cyber 
security. Hence, the need for strong cooperation is evident instead of 
superficial private-public partnerships.67 In addition, the use of 
simulated threats would highlight the vulnerabilities of the CI. At the 
national level, the UK started the Cyber Storm Exercise in 2006 (now 
Cyberstorm III). At the EU level, the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA) coordinated the Cyber Europe exercise in 
November 2010 which was limited to the public sector.68 The integration 
of the private sector, scheduled for the next exercise,69 will be as crucial, if 
not more, given that most CI remain privately owned.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
The importance of private companies in cyber security extends beyond 
the domain of CI. They are the de facto providers of software used by 
everyone, whether individuals, governments, or corporations. The prob-
lem is that most companies choose to release insufficiently tested soft-
ware, which leaves the door open for attacks. Private companies consider 
that the speed of release on the market will bring global benefits that out-
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weigh the costs of limited security because: 1) the flaws are unlikely to be 
discovered, and 2) the company will have time to issue a patch. However, 
their analysis does not correspond to the reality of cyberspace. Vulnera-
bilities are discovered before being patched; and patches, however regu-
larly they are provided, do not arrive soon enough to prevent exploitation. 
Those vulnerabilities are even given a name: zero-day vulnerabilities. 
Zero-day vulnerabilities occur "when a flaw in software code is discov-
ered, and the code exploiting the flaw appears before a fix or patch is 
available."70 Such malicious codes are increasing in severity,71 as evi-
denced by the frequent patches the security companies provide retrospec-
tively.72 Not illegal as such, the vulnerabilities discovered are part of 
white and black markets and can open the door to malevolent actions.73 
In defiance of the software companies' best intentions, and often with the 
help of rogue ISPs, they are used to spread malware, to compromise com-
puters, and create botnets. They are the hidden face of cyber crime and 
cyber attacks. Their immediate impact is not necessarily easily quantifi-
able. Botnets, for example, are rarely noticed by the owners of the infected 
computers. They can slow down the bandwidth; but other factors also 
contribute to that result, making their detection difficult, at least by the 
end-user.74 In addition, they can be dormant or they can be used for years 
before being detected.75 But if botnets were to be a measure of the soft-
ware vulnerabilities' impact in cyberspace, the scale of the damage would 
become more visible and could not be overlooked. Indeed, botnets would 
not be for sale on the black market if selling them did not bring profit. If 
they cost each a mere U.S. $0.04,76 for instance, then profit can only be 
realized if there are tens of thousands of them.77 One security company 
reportedly uncovered 1.9 million infected computers that at one point had 
been responsible for spreading most of the spam found in cyberspace.78, 
79 In other words, the economic analysis adopted by software companies 
does not take into account (or not sufficiently) that the costs of non-
secure software are significant, that these costs will be borne by others on 
the network and ultimately by themselves in clean-up operations,80 that 
those others are millions of people and companies because of the very 
nature of the Internet, and that as a consequence, the social cost of soft-
ware vulnerabilities far outweighs the companies' own individual cost in 
delaying release to conduct further tests.81 The calculus, which does not 
imply an intention of wrongdoing, does not accurately reflect the distrib-
uted nature of the Internet. In doing so, it downplays the long-term 
impact of current vulnerabilities.
Of course, to fix the vulnerabilities after release is laudable; it is also 
commendable that those companies participate in huge clean-up 
operations of botnets like Microsoft did in 2010.82 However, there is 
nothing more paradoxical than Microsoft (and others) spending money to 
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circumscribe the effects of the very vulnerabilities they contributed to 
create in the first place. Their efforts in damage limitation should not 
distract from the fact that, by their business model, they allowed enough 
time between the release and the patch for computers to be 
compromised.83 In the long run, given the security costs, one can only 
wonder if these companies' current economic analysis of cyber security's 
costs and benefits is sustainable.
What is also surprising is that we, private citizens and governments alike, 
tolerate these technical vulnerabilities and their consequences as the price 
to pay for innovation and competition in a free market. Today, we would 
not tolerate a car built and then driven on our networks of roads without 
brakes or with a feeble braking system.84 Why then do we accept insuffi-
cient safety measures on the information highway? It may well be that we 
suffer from the same tendency to overlook or downplay the real costs of 
the risks taken in using flawed software. Indeed, many end-users do not 
have up-to-date software or any security software at all. The last survey of 
the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) in August 2010 revealed that 
7% of Internet users among the 10 to 24-year-old population in the UK 
still do not have any software to protect their computer and data;85 and 
that among the 93% who do have one, 7% do not update it.86 The latter 
said they were deterred from updating the anti-malware protection 
because of the perceived technical difficulties (a staggering 33% of the 7% 
who did not update over the past year), a belief that the risk is too low 
(12%), or that it is too expensive to update (9%).87 Those last two 
responses show that the risks taken when going online without updated 
software and the costs of doing so are calculated against the immediate 
impact they have on the user, ignoring the effect such behavior has on the 
network as a whole. As a result, the risks are unwittingly downplayed.
Enhanced education programs will certainly help reduce such behaviors 
from end-users,88 but they will not tackle the problem of software vulner-
abilities at its source. Companies will need incentives to release better-
tested software. These could come from the stock market, as a recent 
study shows that shareholders react positively to investments in better IT 
security.89 But it will probably also have to come from governments, both 
as regulators and as "large-scale purchasers." Indeed, as users, govern-
ments can influence the market.90 Some institutions, for example, 
decided to switch from Windows to Linux as a means to lower the costs.91 
They could take similar decisions, buying more secure software, if 
improvement in security and a subsequent decrease in costs were demon-
strated. As increased users of Web 2.0 technologies, they may also push 
for better security. Indeed, the very success of Web 2.0 technology, which 
rests on its ability to promote sharing of information among users, is also 
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its downside. The technology encourages users to add links and click on 
links whose noxiousness will not be apparent and so far are rarely 
checked for malware.92 The cascading effects are an increased propaga-
tion of viruses and worms on platforms such as Facebook, MySpace, Twit-
ter, and Bebo. In an effort to woo citizens, big institutions such as the EU 
Parliament more frequently use the opportunities offered by social net-
working websites. However, there might come a point when they will be 
more concerned about the risks and thus more demanding about the 
security of the technology used.
As regulators, governments could also intervene to require changes. Yet 
issues arise regarding the principle and modalities of such intervention. 
Ideologically, Western governments, especially the United States, have 
been reluctant to intervene in the private sector.93 It is only when 
vulnerabilities become a threat to public order, such as when spam 
significantly slows down Internet traffic, have governments decided to 
intervene. Moreover, when they do, they tend to criminalize the 
consequences rather than dealing with the causes, which is not 
necessarily an efficient approach. For spam, the United States and the EU 
legislated massively against spam in 2003–2004, but the decrease in 
spam noticed in 2004–2005 seemed not to originate from the legislation. 
Rather, the decrease was the result of technological change, in which the 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) rerouted spam emails to filter them.94 In 
other words, governments may have been better inspired to regulate ISPs 
than to criminalize spam. This involvement of the ISPs is at the heart of 
some countries' policies to tackle spam.95 For example, in 2005 the 
Australian Communication and Media Authority (ACMA) developed the 
Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI). The AISI collects data of 
compromised computers and passes the information daily to the 
participating ISPs. The latter in turn warn their customers and advise 
them on how to fix the compromised machine, constraining their Internet 
connectivity if necessary and possible.96
Restricting access to the Internet may raise concerns for some, given its 
centrality in our lives, but nobody objects to a driver being temporarily 
forbidden to drive should his or her car fail the yearly road test and not be 
repaired.97 So what can governments do to ensure that every user updates 
his or her software on a regular basis? Rather than presenting anti-spam 
regulations, the government could develop policies to tackle the immedi-
ate consequences of software vulnerabilities.98 The indirect impact of 
such an initiative could be significant; for example, users could stop buy-
ing some IT products if their vulnerabilities lead to successive bans by the 
ISPs because of the inconvenience of being banned even for a limited 
period each time. Consequently, software companies would have to dras-
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tically limit the vulnerabilities of their products if they want to keep their 
customers and remain competitive. In other words, they will be forced to 
change their economic analysis of the costs and benefits of releasing 
insufficiently tested software. This indirect way of fighting vulnerabilities 
would certainly be better than the policy of ISPs increasing their band-
width in order to cope with the slowdowns botnets traffic creates. It will 
also allow for the high bandwidth used by some institutions, such as uni-
versities, to be used fully rather than for unwillingly hiding botnets.99 In 
the long term, governments need to recognize the real costs of software 
vulnerabilities and take action rather than overlook the phenomenon.100 
Such a strategy would reduce cyber crime and save money that could be 
spent in education programs or in the fight against cyber threats.
Conclusion
One expert has opined that "at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the 
overwhelming challenge that confronts Western policymakers is the man-
agement of diverse, amorphous, and qualitative security risks, rather than 
the fixed, quantifiable threats of yesteryear."101 Cyber threats, whether 
emanating from crime, terrorism, or war are extremely diverse. Their pat-
terns are not always easy to sketch, given the difficulties of detecting cyber 
incidents, the complexity in coordinating the collection of relevant data at 
national and international levels, and the shortcomings of reporting 
mechanisms for cyber crime in some countries, like the UK. Our knowl-
edge of those variables is often too unreliable and incomplete and there-
fore needs to be drastically improved. We will then avoid unnecessary 
media hype, as well as potentially hidden agendas in reports on cyber 
threats. Moreover, cyber threats should not be viewed as the only risks to 
security in cyberspace. Vulnerabilities of physical premises and of soft-
ware constitute an important element of cyber risks. Particular attention 
should be given to the latter types. Although not illegal in themselves, 
software vulnerabilities open windows of opportunity for malevolent 
actors willing to exploit them.
We may have switched to the Internet being the "village" square when it 
comes to freedom of expression, but we have more difficulties in conceiv-
ing of the Internet as the common space where illegal activities also flour-
ish and for which we—governments, individuals, and companies—are all 
responsible. This is what Beck calls the "solidarity of living things that 
affects everyone and everything equally in the threat." A Risk Society 
underlines that to resist recognition of risks, wittingly or unwittingly, is 
one way of waiving responsibility. Because cyberspace is naturally a net-
work, all users will ultimately suffer. For Beck, society must embrace and 
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promote knowledge by self-reflection. This starts by elaborating methods 
and methodologies to record and report incidents in order to understand 
them, but the ultimate challenge will be to know what risks we accept in a 
democracy, including those that dissent brings.
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